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IS A PAID IDEA TUITION REIMBURSEMENT CASE MOOT?
THE INTERSECTION OF PENDENCY, TUITION
REIMBURSEMENT, AND MOOTNESS
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley*
I. INTRODUCTION
If a plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking $10,000 in damages and
subsequently received a check from the defendant for $10,000, her
lawsuit would be of no practical significance (moot). The court would
then dismiss her case. However, the matter is not so simple within the
context of certain tuition reimbursement cases under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). These cases typically involve the
following scenario: parents enroll their children in private schools, file an
administrative complaint alleging that their school district violated the
IDEA, prevail in an administrative hearing, and receive reimbursement
for the tuition paid to the private school as a remedy. The next school
year, the parents file a new administrative complaint asserting another
violation of the IDEA and, again, requesting tuition reimbursement. Due
to the pendency provision of the IDEA, which requires school districts to
ensure that students remain in their “then-current educational placement”
during administrative or judicial review, the school district must ensure
that the student remain in the private school. Courts have further held
that the pendency provision, under these circumstances, obligates school
districts to pay the private school tuition during the entirety of the
subsequent proceeding. By the time such an administrative complaint is
appealed to a court—sometimes several years later—the student’s tuition
has been paid and the school district has most likely devised a new
educational plan for the student.
Are these cases moot? Courts have struggled to answer this question
and have reached differing conclusions. This article explores how courts
have applied the mootness doctrine to paid tuition reimbursement cases
under the IDEA. This article further explains how courts have reached
* Senior Attorney, New York State Education Department; LL.M Suffolk University Law School;
J.D. Roger Williams University School of Law. Thank you to Kaitlin Morton-Bentley for her
insights and the editorial staff of the Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal for their
careful editing. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

395

2_Morton-Bentley Edited (Do Not Delete)

396

8/1/2015 11:23 PM

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2015

divergent results as the result of a conflict between the doctrines of
pendency, tuition reimbursement, and mootness. Therefore, this article
offers a proposed amendment to the IDEA that would reconcile these
incongruous doctrines.
Part II outlines the basic provisions of the IDEA, with special
attention afforded to pendency and the availability of tuition
reimbursement as a remedy. Part III is a brief summary of the doctrine of
mootness and judicial exceptions to the doctrine. Part IV analyzes
judicial decisions that have addressed the intersection of pendency,
tuition reimbursement, and mootness and how these decisions have
reached conflicting outcomes. Part V describes a proposed amendment
that would resolve the question of whether paid tuition reimbursement
claims are moot. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE IDEA
A. Overview
The primary goal of the IDEA is to ensure that students with
disabilities are provided with a free appropriate public education
(FAPE).1 To accomplish this goal, the IDEA offers financial assistance
to states that comply with its procedures.2,3
The most significant procedural requirements under the IDEA are
detailed below. A school district must identify students with disabilities
who reside within the district.4 Having done so, the school district must
conduct an initial evaluation of these students.5 If the school district
determines that these students have needs that require special education,
the school district must generate an Individualized Education Plan (IEP)
1
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2), (d) (2012); Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192, 199, 200 (1982).
2
This article discusses Part B of the IDEA, which pertains to students aged 3–21. Part C
of the IDEA concerns Early Intervention services, which are special education services offered to
infants through age two.
3
Strictly speaking, the IDEA is a funding statute—although it also contains elements of a
civil rights statute. For instance, the IDEA allows a parent who is a prevailing party to recover his or
her attorneys’ fees (20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2012)). Also, with regard to a student’s right to
participate in extracurricular activities, the IDEA incorporates the civil rights standard imposed by
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (34 C.F.R. § 300.107 (2006)); § 34 C.F.R. 300.117 (2006); see
Nonacademic Services, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,489 (Aug. 23, 1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 100(b),
121(a), and 121(m)); Nonacademic Settings, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,497 (Aug. 23, 1977) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pt. 100(b), 121(a), and 121(m)); Transfer and Redesignation of ED Regulations, 45 Fed.
Reg. 77, 368, 77, 370 (Nov. 21, 1980) (to be codified 24 C.F.R. Ch. II); see generally Application of
the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 13-152 (New York State Educ. Dep’t Office of State Review),
available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/ 2013/13-152.pdf (last accessed Mar. 18,
2015).
4
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2006).
5
§ 1414(a), (b).
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for each student.6 The IEP is generated by an IEP team that includes the
student’s parents, teacher, and a representative of the school district.7 The
IEP identifies pertinent information about each student, including his or
her academic, social, emotional, and physical levels.8 Each IEP must also
contain annual goals based upon a student’s academic, social, emotional,
and physical needs.9 After developing an IEP, a school district must
generally implement it within its public school system. IEPs must be
reviewed on an annual basis to ensure they continue to meet students’
needs.10
If the parents of a student with a disability believe that an IEP was
not developed in conformity with the IDEA, they have the right to
administrative, and then judicial, review of the student’s IEP.11
Specifically, parents may file an administrative form called a due process
complaint notice that identifies the school district’s alleged violations of
the IDEA.12 These allegations are adjudicated in an informal
administrative trial presided over by an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO);
the officer is vested with the authority to determine whether the student
received a FAPE.13 The decision of an impartial hearing officer is subject
to judicial review, with some states, such as New York, providing a
second level of administrative review by a State Review Officer (SRO).14
B. Tuition Reimbursement
The IDEA’s remedies include injunctive relief and reimbursement
for private school tuition.15 Many jurisdictions also recognize
compensatory education, an equitable remedy that provides students with
educational services in order to make up for a denial of FAPE.16 While
6

§ 1414(d).
§ 1414(d)(1)(B).
8
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) .
9
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II).
10
§ 1414(d)(4)(A).
11
20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6); (c)(2)(A); (f); (i)(2) (2012).
12
§ 1415(c)(2)(A).
13
§ 1415(f); see (f)(3)(E).
14
§ 1415(g), (i). While states use various initials or acronyms to refer to these
administrative officials, I refer to the initial decision-makers as “IHOs” and the second-level
reviewers as “SROs” throughout this article for consistency.
15
§ 1415 (f)(3)(E)(iii) (injunctive relief: “Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to
preclude a hearing officer from ordering a[n] [LEA] to comply with procedural requirements under
this section.”); §1415(b)(1), 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2006) (independent educational evaluations);
20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2006) (tuition reimbursement).
16
See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education: An Annotated Update of the
Law, 251 ED. LAW REP. 501 (2010); see also P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2008); Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008); Bd. of Educ. of Fayette
Cnty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2007); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d
1489 (9th Cir. 1994); Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Courts
7
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the IDEA was originally concerned with promoting access to the public
education system, IDEA litigation has become increasingly concerned
with tuition reimbursement.17 The remedy was endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court in two seminal cases and later codified into the
language of the IDEA.18
The tuition reimbursement remedy is available to parents who,
dissatisfied with the recommendations of an IEP, unilaterally enroll their
child in a private school.19 If the parents file a due process complaint
notice and an administrative officer finds that both (1) the school district
did not offer the student a FAPE; and (2) the private school was
appropriate to meet the student’s needs, the parent may recoup tuition
paid (or owed) to the private school for the school year in question.20
Additionally, in keeping with its civil rights leanings, the IDEA permits
an award of attorneys’ fees to parents’ attorneys who substantially
prevail in any aspect of an administrative or judicial proceeding.21
C. Pendency
A unique provision of the IDEA, and the provision giving rise to the
issue discussed in this article, is its pendency provision.22 This provision
unanimously agree that a claim for compensatory education presents a live controversy and insulates
a case from being moot. For recent cases, see J.T. ex rel. J.T. v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 564 F. App’x
677 (3d Cir. 2014); L.O. ex rel. D.O. v. E. Allen Cnty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:11 CV 178, 2014 WL
4905484 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2014); Simmons v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., No. 4:13-CV-04446KAW, 2014 WL 2738214, at n.7 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014); Fullmore v. D.C., No. 1:13-CV-00409
(CRC), 2014 WL 1871343, at *3 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014); Morris v. D.C., No.: 14–0338 (RC), 2014
WL 1648293 (D.D.C. April 25, 2014).
17
See Thomas Mayes & Perry Zirkel, Trends in Tuition Reimbursement Cases, 22
REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001).
18
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012); see Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter By &
Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of
Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 373–74 (1985).
19
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
20
Although the IDEA and case law contemplate tuition reimbursement, a recent decision by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a parent may pursue a direct payment from a school
district to a private school “in appropriate circumstances.” E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d
442, 453 (2d Cir. 2014). The court did not define what “appropriate circumstances” must exist
before such a remedy becomes feasible. Additionally, as recognized by the Court in Burlington,
“equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief”,
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374. Many courts conceive of equitable considerations as a third
requirement that must be assessed before tuition may be awarded to a parent.
21
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2012). School districts may also recover attorneys’ fees under
limited circumstances; see § 1415(i)(3)(B).
22
Courts have used different terms to describe this provision. See, e.g., Murphy v.
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2002) (stay-put); Student X
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316 (NGG)(RER), 2008 WL 4890440, at *7, 15, 20–26
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (pendency); Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir.
1996) (pendent placement). I refer to this provision as “pendency” throughout this article for
consistency.
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requires in relevant part,
[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this
section, unless the State or [school district] and the parents otherwise
agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement
of the child . . . .23

The intention behind the pendency provision was to ensure that, if a
dispute arose, a student with a disability would continue to receive
services from his or her public school during the dispute. In other words,
as explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Drinker by Drinker
v. Colonial School Dist., pendency was intended “to strip schools of the
unilateral authority that they had traditionally employed to exclude
It bears mentioning that
disabled students . . . from school.”24
“placement” has an idiomatic meaning within the context of the IDEA,
referring to the general contours of a student’s special education program
and not the literal “placement” of a student within a school building.25
Thus, a student’s pendency placement refers to a program and not a
physical location.26
The IDEA’s pendency provision imposes a default rule: if parents
and school districts disagree, then the student must stay in his or her
current placement during administrative and judicial review. Therefore,
an agreement between parents and the school district on an appropriate
placement will always control. Courts have held that an administrative or
judicial decision that a unilateral placement was appropriate constitutes a
constructive “agreement” between the parties that the private school is a
student’s pendency placement.27 This fiction obligates school districts to
23

20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2012).
Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996); see also
George M. Holland, The Stay-Put Provision and its Implications to Practitioners, N.J. LAWYER: THE
MAGAZINE, June 2003, at 35 (2003), available at http://www.njsba.com/images/content/1
/0/1001996/june2003.pdf (last accessed Mar. 19, 2015).
25
See, e.g., T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009); James v.
D.C., No. 12–376(RJL), 2013 WL 2650091, at *3 (D.D.C. June 9, 2013).
26
T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 171 (2d Cir. 2014) (“the
pendency provision does not guarantee a disabled child the right to remain in the exact same school
with the exact same service providers while his administrative and judicial proceedings are pending.
Instead, it guarantees only the same general level and type of services that the disabled child was
receiving”); Concerned Parents and Citizens for the Continuing Educ. at Malcolm X Pub. Sch. 79 v.
N.Y.C Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1980).
27
Bd. of Educ. of the Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 2002);
Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 83; Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cali. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d
635, 641 (9th Cir. 1990); Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., Hawaii, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1015,
1019 (D. Haw. 2012) aff’d sub nom. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., 506 F. App’x 613
(9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion); City Sch. Dist. of City of Buffalo v. Darlene S., No. 05-CV0572E(F), 2006 WL 287871, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2006). The IDEA’s implementing regulations
explicitly provide that if an IHO’s decision in a one-tier State or an SRO’s decision in a two-tier
State “agrees with the child’s parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must
be treated as an agreement between the State and the parents” 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(d) (2006).
24
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maintain a student’s enrollment in a private school. Further, courts have
held that a school district must pay the student’s tuition at the private
school during the pendency of the proceedings.28 This obligation is
absolute: even if an administrative or judicial official eventually finds
that the school district offered a student a FAPE, it may not recoup the
tuition paid to the private school.29
Having won a prior tuition reimbursement appeal, it is conceivable
that a parent could maintain a student’s enrollment in a private school at
public expense for several additional years by continuing to file
administrative complaints. Thus, pendency can prove a significant boon
for parents who seek to maintain their children in a private school at
public expense.30 This remarkable effect of pendency is amplified by the
length of the administrative and judicial review process. Although the
drafters of the IDEA appear to have intended a quick resolution to
impartial hearings, disputes can often last for several years. This delay is
due to several reasons. First, although the IDEA imposes deadlines for
the issuance of administrative decisions at both the district and state
level, federal regulations permit potentially indefinite extensions to these
deadlines.31 Second, judicial decision dates are subject to varying court
rules and internal deadlines. Finally, administrative and judicial
tribunals, for a multitude of reasons, may not issue decisions in a timely
manner.
If the parties do not agree as to a student’s current placement and a
28
Schutz, 290 F.3d at 482–84; Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d
195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2002); Zvi D. ex rel. Shirley D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906, 908 (2d Cir.
1982); Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1982); T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall
Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 11 CV 6459(VB), 2012 WL 4069299, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012), vacated
on other grounds, 752 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. v. S.S., No. 09 Civ. 810(CM),
2010 WL 983719, at *1, *6, *8–*9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 421
F. Supp. 2d 692, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Gabel ex rel. L.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. Sch.
Dist., 368 F. Supp. 2d 313, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bd. of Educ. of City of New York v. Ambach, 612
F. Supp. 230, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari in M.R.
v. Ridley Sch. Dist., a Third Circuit case challenging the scope of a school district’s obligation to
pay private tuition under pendency. 744 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 2014). Ridley affirmed that a school
district’s obligation to pay arises at the time a due process complaint notice is filed and continues
through the entirety of administrative and judicial proceedings. Id. at 123– 28. The court concluded
its decision by noting that it was “not insensitive to the financial burden [the] decision will impose
on school districts” but reasoned that the pendency payment rule was “an unavoidable consequence
of the balance Congress struck to ensure stability for a vulnerable group of children.” Id. at 128.
29
Clovis, 903 F.2d at 641; S.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *8–*12; D.C. v. Jeppsen, 468 F. Supp.
2d 107, 112 (D.D.C. 2006) remanded on other grounds, 514 F.3d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Aaron M.
v. Yomtoob, No. 00 C 7732, 2003 WL 22836308, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2003).
30
The administrative decision must explicitly indicate that the parent’s unilateral placement
was appropriate (see L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Unless the district court or agency actually reaches the merits of the appropriate placement, we
will not imply a current educational placement. . . .”).
31
34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2006) (“A hearing or reviewing officer may grant specific
extensions of time . . . at the request of either party.”).
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parent did not previously prevail in a tuition reimbursement proceeding,
a court or administrative agency must conduct a more fact-intensive
investigation to determine what constitutes the student’s then-current
educational placement. Courts utilize different approaches to make this
determination, the three most prevalent being: (1) “the placement
described in the child’s most recently implemented IEP”; (2) the actual
placement operating at the time of the most recently implemented IEP;
and (3) “the operative placement actually functioning at the time . . .
when the stay put provision of the IDEA was invoked.”32 An
interpretative letter issued by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office
of Special Education Programs (OSEP) in 2007 opined that a student’s
pendency is determined at the time the due process complaint notice is
filed, lending some support to the third formulation.33
III. MOOTNESS AND STANDING
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “moot” as “[h]aving no
practical significance; hypothetical or academic.”34 Thus, a moot case is
one that presents no issues for a court to rule upon — or issues without
practical import. Mootness can also be conceived of as “an extension of
the doctrine of standing,” the doctrine that governs who may pursue a
legal claim in federal court.35 According to the United States Supreme
Court, “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to
grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’”36 The Court
also recently cited with approval the following statement from a 1984
32

Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158,
163 (2d Cir. 2004), supplemented sub nom. Mackey v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist.,
112 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I., 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1019, aff’d
sub nom. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I., 506 F. App’x 613 (citing cases).
33
Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197 (Dep’t of Educ. Office of Special Education Programs
Sept. 4, 2007), available at https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/ guid/idea/letters/20073/hampden090407stayput3q2007.pdf (last accessed Mar. 19, 2015). An OSEP letter from two
decades prior, however, noted that the last agreed-upon IEP would “generally be taken to mean
current special education and related services provided in accordance with a child’s most recent
[IEP]” (Letter to Baugh, 211 IDELR 481) (Dep’t of Educ. Office of Special Education Programs
July 2 1987).
34
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (9th ed. 2009).
35
Corey C. Watson, Comment, Mootness and the Constitution, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 143,
150 n.65 (1991) (citing Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82
YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973) [“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement
of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).]”). Although some
courts have indicated that the quote from Professor Monaghan originated with the Supreme Court’s
opinion in U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, this decision merely quoted Professor Monaghan’s
formulation. 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980); see Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655,
661 (5th Cir. 2006).
36
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1335 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv.
Emp. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012)).
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case: “[A]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in
the outcome of the litigation, [a] case is not moot.”37
The Supreme Court has held that the mootness doctrine derives from
the “cases” and “controversies” jurisdiction granted to the federal
judiciary by Article III of the United States Constitution.38 Thus, in
federal court, mootness is a constitutional predicate for jurisdiction. This
is relevant to the case law discussed in this article, which is largely
(although not exclusively) composed of federal cases. A competing
theory of mootness advanced by judges and commentators is that
mootness is a prudential doctrine that merely provides judges with the
discretion to excise non-adversarial litigation from their dockets.39 Some
state courts adopted this interpretation.40 Scholars have produced
gradations of these theories, but each generally aligns with the
constitutional or prudential school.41
A. Exceptions
If a dispute is moot, the ordinary result is that the case is dismissed.
Because mootness derives from the Constitution, federal courts must
dismiss a moot case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However,
courts faced with what they deemed to be unpalatable results stemming
from this doctrine created exceptions to the general rule. Most notably,
an otherwise moot case may be retained by a court if (1) the complainedof activity is capable of repetition, yet evading review; (2) dismissal of
the case would impose collateral legal consequences on a party; (3)
resolution of the case would be in the public interest; or (4) the defendant
voluntarily ceased the activity giving rise to the lawsuit at some point
during the litigation.42
There are two requirements litigants must satisfy to avoid a mootness
dismissal under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
37

Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2287 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)).
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Straube v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.
Supp. 1164, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
39
Watson, supra note 35, at 151–53.
40
See, e.g., Hussein v. State, 81 A.D.3d 132, 135 (App. Div. 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 899
(2012); City of New York v. Maul, 59 A.D.3d 187, 197, 873 N.Y.S.2d 540, 549 (App. Div. 2009),
aff’d, 14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010) (McGuire, J., dissenting). Therefore, a state whose constitution does not
compel the dismissal of moot cases would arguably have greater discretion in deciding whether a
moot case must be dismissed.
41
See Watson, supra note 35, at 150–59.
42
See, e.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (capable of repetition yet evading review); Sibron v. N.Y., 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(collateral legal consequences); Barnett v. Adams, 273 P.3d 378, 381 (Utah 2012) (public interest);
Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005)
(voluntary cessation).
38
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exception: (1) the complained-of activity must be “too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation” and (2) there must be “a reasonable
expectation that the [plaintiff will] be subjected to the same action
again.”43 This exception requires that defendants remain accountable for
wrongs committed against plaintiffs that are short in duration and likely
to reoccur. The short in duration requirement ensures that defendants are
not insulated from liability if their wrongful conduct happens to be short
in duration. The recurrence requirement mitigates the exception,
however, by requiring that the wrongful activity was more than a fleeting
or isolated incident.44
Additionally, some courts have applied a “collateral legal
consequences” exception to moot claims.45 The first significant
pronouncement of this doctrine came from the Supreme Court’s 1968
decision in Sibron v. New York.46 In Sibron, the City of New York
convicted the defendant of possession of heroin.47 The defendant moved
to suppress the heroin before trial.48 When this motion was denied, the
defendant pled guilty and received a six-month sentence.49 By the time
the defendant’s appeal reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant
had served his sentence, but his appeal of the denial of the suppression
motion remained pending.50
The Supreme Court held that Sibron’s appeal was not moot,
indicating that collateral legal consequences would affect the defendant
were his appeal dismissed.51 In this respect, the Court announced a
general rule: “a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no
possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the
43

Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482.
Briefly, I note that the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act does not affect the mootness
inquiry because a federal court only has jurisdiction where there is an actual case or controversy (28
U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (2012); see Christopher P. by Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir.
1990); San Diego Cnty. Office of Educ. v. Pollock, No. 13-CV-1647-BEN BLM, 2014 WL 2860279
(S.D. Cal. Jun. 20, 2014).
45
See Pollock, 2014 WL 2860279, at *3; Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw. v. Rodarte ex rel.
Chavez, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1113 (D. Haw. 2000); Browell v. Lemahieu, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1117,
1128 (D. Haw. 2000); see also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir.
1999); Pub. Utilities Comm’n of State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996)
(collateral legal consequences exception “is most commonly applied in habeas corpus proceedings
where the petitioner has subsequently obtained the relief sought.”); Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935 F.2d
303, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
46
Sibron v. N. Y., 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Sibron’s appeal was a “companion case [ ]” (id. at
43) to the Court’s famed well-known decision in Terry v. Ohio which upheld police officers’ right to
stop and frisk individuals under certain circumstances. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 44.
48
Id. at 44–45.
49
Id. at 50–51.
50
Id. at 45, 50.
51
Id. at 50, 57.
44
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basis of the challenged conviction.”52 In Sibron’s case, these
consequences were potential impeachment and increased penalties
(contingent upon his commission of a crime and subsequent
prosecution).53 Without further elaboration, the Court also stated that
“[t]here are doubtless other collateral consequences.”54
The Sibron rationale has crept into civil cases.55 Some courts have
even shifted the inquiry so as to hold that collateral practical
consequences prevented cases from being moot.56 While practical
consequences that pertain to “criteria that affect job accessibility and
social status” are similar to the effects of a criminal conviction, other
practical consequences—such as the payment of tuition costs under the
IDEA—are far removed from the criteria envisioned by the Court.57
Several state courts also apply a public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine.58 Generally, this doctrine requires that a case present
an issue of public importance that is likely to reoccur. While several
courts have held that an injunction ordering compliance with the IDEA is
in the public interest for purposes of a preliminary injunction, it is
doubtful that a paid tuition reimbursement case would meet these criteria
given its focus on compensation for a single student.59
Finally, a court will refuse to find a case moot if a defendant
voluntarily ceases the activity that gave rise to the litigation “at some

52

Id. at 57.
Id. at 55–56.
54
Id. at 56. The legal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction can indeed be
numerous and severe. A recent investigation found that “Federal, state, and local laws impose a
convoluted network of barriers on anyone with a criminal record” and that “[t]hese collateral
consequences of conviction . . . can affect nearly every aspect of a person’s life . . . .” Monica
Haymond, Should A Criminal Record Come With Collateral Consequences?, NPR NEWS Dec. 6,
2014, available at http://www.npr.org/2014/12/06/368742300/should-a-criminal-record-come-withcollateral-consequences (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
55
See David H. Donaldson, Jr., A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts
Part One–The Continuing Impact Doctrines, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1314 (1976) and cases cited
therein. Not all courts have applied this doctrine in civil cases. See, e.g., Barnett v. Adams, 273 P.3d
378, 381 (Utah 2012). The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly dodged the issue in a 1978 case involving
alleged collateral legal consequences stemming from suspension ordered issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. S.E.C. v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 108 n.3 (1978); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 502 n.1 (1980) (Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
56
Donaldson, supra note 55, at 1315, 1316.
57
Id. at 1317.
58
See, e.g., Barnett, 273 P.3d at 382; Glantz v. Daniel, 837 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2013), review denied (Sept. 25, 2013); Gallery v. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm’n,
518 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W. Va. 1999); In re Laura H., 936 N.E.2d 801, 804–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
New York has condensed the capable of repetition yet evading review and public interest exceptions
into a single exception. See Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 715, 409 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1980);
Matter of McGrath, 245 A.D.2d 1081, 1082, 667 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1997).
59
See W.H. ex rel. B.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. CVF080374LJODLB, 2009 WL
2959849, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009).
53
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advanced stage of the appellate proceedings.”60 The rationale underlying
this exception is that it would allow defendants to game the judicial
system: a defendant could subject a plaintiff to illegal activity through
the duration of legal proceedings and, at the last minute, escape liability
by ceasing the activity before an appellate court rendered a decision.
Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable to allow a defendant
to take advantage of a dismissal based upon mootness. This exception is
not applicable to the paid tuition reimbursement cases discussed in this
article because any alleged harm would pertain to an expired school year
and, thus, could not be remediated by a school district’s voluntary
cessation of an activity.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF PENDENCY, TUITION REIMBURSEMENT, AND
MOOTNESS
Pendency, tuition reimbursement, and mootness have coalesced in
several reported cases. The bulk of these cases arise in New York,
whose courts entertain an unusually high number of IDEA appeals.61 The
cases discussed below present several factors to consider in determining
whether a paid tuition reimbursement claim under the IDEA may be
considered moot. Courts have generally found these disputes moot and
proceeded to analyze them under the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception or the collateral legal consequence exception (which,
as explained below, is more accurately characterized as a school
district’s interest in avoiding future pendency obligations).
A. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
1. Honig v. Doe
Before analyzing paid tuition reimbursement cases that have applied
this exception, it is necessary to discuss the seminal case involving the
IDEA and recurrence, Honig v. Doe.62 In Honig, two students eligible for
special education as students with an emotional disturbance challenged

60

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 331 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: A Follow-Up
Analysis, 303 ED. LAW REP. 1 (2014) (“[T]he top six jurisdictions in [impartial hearing]
adjudications were, in descending order, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, New York,
California, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, with a different sequence among them for filings.”); see
also Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE Under the IDEA, 33 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214, 236 (2013) (“[T]he states of “Hawaii, New Jersey, and New York
appear to have a particular propensity for tuition and related reimbursement [claims].”).
62
Honig, 484 U.S. at 305.
61
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indefinite suspensions imposed by their school district.63 The activity
giving rise to these suspensions was not insubstantial; one student
choked a fellow student and left “abrasions on the child’s neck” while
the other “st[ole], extort[ed] money from fellow students, and ma[de]
sexual comments to female classmates.”64 The crux of the Court’s
decision was that a school district may not unilaterally impose a
suspension of more than ten days under the IDEA without violating the
IDEA’s pendency protections.65
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the Court examined the
two plaintiffs’ standing to pursue their IDEA claims.66 One plaintiff, by
the time of the Court’s decision, was twenty-four years old and no longer
eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA. 67 The
Court dismissed this plaintiff’s claim as moot with little elaboration.68
The second plaintiff, however, presented a more complicated factual
scenario. On the one hand, he was “not faced with any proposed
expulsion or suspension proceedings” and no longer resided within the
defendant school district.69 But, on the other hand, this plaintiff remained
eligible for special education services and had not yet graduated high
school.70
First, the Court in Honig found that the complained-of activity—a
school suspension imposed following in response to classroom
behaviors—was too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation. The
Court noted, borrowing a phrase from an IDEA case issued three years
prior to its decision, Burlington School Committee v. Mass. Department
of Education, that the student had already been illegally kept out of
school for years due to the “ponderous” nature of IDEA litigation.71
Therefore, the Court implied that dismissing the case as moot would
constitute a tacit endorsement of this lethargy. Thus, the Court concluded
that the situation was too short in duration.72
Second, the Supreme Court found that there was a reasonable
expectation that the student would be subjected to the same action
again.73 It based its holding on three considerations: (1) the student’s
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 312.
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 317–23.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317–18.
Id.
Id. at 318, 337.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 322.
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continued eligibility for services under the IDEA; (2) the “nature of [the
student’s] disability”; and (3) the school district’s continued insistence
that it could unilaterally withdraw IDEA-eligible students from public
schools.74 The Court did not find the student’s residence within another
school district relevant because California’s lack of a policy regarding
disciplinary suspensions meant the student would have encountered this
problem in any California school district.75
2. Post-Honig analyses
Following Honig, courts have agreed that claims relating to IEPs or
IEP meetings—the bread and butter of tuition reimbursement claims—
are too short to be fully litigated prior to their cessation.76 These courts
frequently reiterate the “ponderous” rationale in support of this
determination.77 It appears, then, that the first prong of the capable of
repetition exception will inevitably be satisfied in a tuition
reimbursement claim. However, the second prong, which asks whether
there is a reasonable expectation that the student will again be subjected
to the same action, must also be satisfied. Analyses of this prong have
produced varied outcomes.
The three factors considered by the Court in Honig relate to the
possibility of recurrence. The first factor asks how many years the
student will be eligible for services under the IDEA. Thus, a claim
presented on behalf of a student with few years of eligibility left would,
according to Honig, be less likely to recur since there are less total years
in which a parent could file a due process complaint notice. Taken
literally, the second and third factors would not make much sense in the
paid tuition reimbursement context where the student did not actually
attend the public school placement recommended by the district. These
can be better understood as fact-specific applications of the general
question of how likely an act is to reoccur.78
Reported cases have offered two additional IDEA-specific
recurrence issues. One is whether the parties possess divergent views on
educational issues affecting the student and, if so, how long they have
held these views. For example, in Student X v. New York City
74

Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 321.
76
See, e.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 85 (2d
Cir. 2005); Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2001); Daniel R.R. v. State
Board of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1989); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Board of
Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994).
77
See cases cited in note 76, supra.
78
Whereas, in Honig, the student attended the public school system and, due to the nature
of his disability, was likely to bring about the consequences complained of in the lawsuit.
75
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Departmemnt of Education, the opposing parties consistently disagreed
over the necessity of home-based services for several years prior to the
school year challenged on appeal.79 This led the court to conclude that
the parties possessed “divergent views” on the necessity of home-based
services such that the plaintiff had a “reasonable expectation of
confronting this controversy every year . . . .”80 Conversely, in Lillibask
ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Connecticut Department of Education, the
school district contended that the student should be placed in a nonpublic school for a single year and, over seven years after making this
recommendation (and consistently educating the student within the
public school system), conceded that its original position was no longer
defensible.81 Under these facts, the Second Circuit found the dispute
moot.82
The second issue is how many IEPs the parent or parents have
challenged. The assumption is that parents who have voiced objections to
a district’s services year after year are more likely to complain the
following year. Some courts, however, have not been persuaded by this
rationale.83 The concern of these courts appears to be that parents could
create the appearance of controversy by complaining year after year.84
3. M.S. ex rel. M.S. v. New York City Department of Education
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in no
79
Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316(NGG)RER, 2008 WL 4890440, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
80
Id. at *14; accord Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining case not moot)
(“[T]he [d]istrict and the [parents] ha[d] conflicting educational philosophies and perceptions of the
[d]istrict’s mainstreaming obligation.”); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th
Cir. 1989) (explaining case not moot) (“Each side of this controversy steadfastly adhere[d] to its
perception of the [IDEA]’s mainstreaming requirement.”).
81
Lillibask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.
2005).
82
Id. A district’s change of position, in and of itself, would not appear a relevant factor.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 331 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see D.C. v. Jeppsen ex rel.
M.J., 468 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Though it is likely both that [the district] will
attempt to move [the student’s] placement in the future and that the change will be challenged by
defendant, such likelihood does not create an exception to the mootness doctrine.”).
83
V.M. v. No. Colonie Sch. Dist., 954 F.Supp.2d 102 (N.D.N.Y. 2013); B.J.S. ex rel. N.S.
v. State Educ. Dep’t, 815 F. Supp. 2d 601 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
84
The Supreme Court has disapproved of this practice. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 684 (1984) (“A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit . . . create the
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it . . . .”). It is of particular concern in the IDEA context
as there is no filing fee associated with filing a due process complaint notice. Additionally, the
IDEA does not impose penalties or sanctions relating to frivolous administrative complaints. The
IDEA does, however, allow a court to award a school district or state educational authority
attorneys’ fees if a “parent’s complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of
litigation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2012).

2_Morton-Bentley Edited (Do Not Delete)

2]

8/1/2015 11:23 PM

IDEA REIMBURSEMENT CASE MOOTNESS

409

uncertain terms, rejected a paid for tuition reimbursement case in M.S. ex
rel. M.S. v. New York City Department of Education.85 For the 2007–08
school year, an IHO found that a June 2007 IEP did not offer the student
a FAPE and that the parent was entitled to an award of tuition
reimbursement at a private school.86 This IHO also ordered the district to
reconvene an IEP meeting to develop an IEP for the student.87 The
district complied, and the parent proceeded to challenge the resultant
June 2008 IEP that applied to the 2008–09 school year.88 Both an IHO
and an SRO found that the June 2008 IEP offered the student a FAPE.89
The school district paid the student’s expenses at the private school for
the 2008–09 school year pursuant to pendency.90
On appeal, the parent argued that the administrative officers erred
and that the school district failed to offer the student a FAPE for the
2008–09 school year.91 The court handily rejected this argument.92 The
court had little trouble finding the dispute moot, noting that the “parents
receiv[ed] full compensation for their expenditures at the [private school]
for the 2008–2009 school year.”93 The court also rejected the parents’
argument that the case was capable of repetition yet evading review
“because each year a new determination is made based on [the student’s]
continuing development, requiring a new assessment under the IDEA.”94
The court further deduced that the true purpose of the parents’ appeal
was attorneys’ fees.95 Noting that the parent “received exactly the kind of
educational placement in a private school that he sought” and that “[t]he
result [of the case] would have been exactly the same” had the attorney
elected not to appeal, the court rejected the parent’s appeal and its
accompanying request for attorneys’ fees.96
4. New York City Department of Education v. S.A. ex rel. N.A.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York squarely
considered the issue of whether a challenge to an IEP for a paid and
expired school year was moot in New York City Department of
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

M.S. ex rel. M.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 275–77.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 279–81.
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 273; see id. at 281.
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Education v. S.A. ex rel. N.A.97 The court began by noting that the parents
and the school district had a “long history of litigation” over the student’s
placement, dating back to 2004.98 The court also noted that an
unappealed IHO decision pertaining to the 2006–07 school year
established the student’s placement at the private school.99 One of the
relevant due process complaint notices filed by the parents in the case
requested tuition reimbursement for the 2009–10 school year.100 An IHO
granted reimbursement, but an SRO reversed.101 The parents then filed an
appeal in federal court in December 2010 (i.e. in the middle of the 2010–
11 school year).102 The district court agreed with the SRO in a separate
decision that was issued in March 2012.103
Contemporaneously with these events, the parents filed an
“amended” due process complaint notice seeking tuition reimbursement
for the 2010–11 school year in November of 2010.104 An IHO granted
this relief in August of 2011 and the school district appealed to an
SRO.105 Before an SRO issued a decision, the school district “fully
reimbursed the [p]arents for all tuition and related services as to the
2010–11 school year in accordance with . . . pendency.”106 An SRO thus
dismissed the school district’s appeal as moot.107 The school district
appealed the SRO’s dismissal of its appeal regarding the 2010–11 school
year.108
On appeal to the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the court found the school district’s appeal presented a live
controversy under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception. On the first prong of this exception, whether the action was
too short in duration to be fully litigated, the court curtly concluded that
it was given IDEA litigation’s “ponderous” nature.109 Turning to the
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

2012).

No. 12 CIV. 1108 DLC, 2012 WL 6028938 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2 n.3.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
See J.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10 CIV. 9056 DAB, 2012 WL 1075843 (S.D.N.Y.

104
N.Y.C. Dep’’t of Educ. v. S.A. ex rel. N.A., No. 12 CIV. 1108 DLC, 2012 WL 6028938,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court’s terminology here is likely incorrect; it would have been
improper for the parents to amend their due process complaint notice as both the IHO and SRO
issued their decisions before this alleged amendment (see J.A., 2012 WL 1075843, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (IHO decision issued in April 2010; SRO decision issued in August 2010).
105
S.A., 2012 WL 6028938, at *2.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at *1.
109
Id. at *2.
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second prong, whether the claim was reasonably capable of repetition,
the court found that it was based upon two factors: (1) “the ongoing
pecuniary interest of the school district based on the IDEA’s stay-put
provision”; and (2) “the prospect of continuing litigation over the
student’s placement.”110 As for the first factor, the S.A. court found “the
[d]istrict’s obligation to pay [the student’s] tuition pending resolution on
the merits of a given proposed, and rejected, IEP” would be uncertain
absent a judicial resolution.111 Regarding the second factor, the court
impliedly concluded that because the parties disagreed in the past, they
would continue to do so in the future. Indeed, the court observed that the
parents had already filed a due process complaint notice for the 2011–12
by the time of the court’s decision.112 Therefore, the court concluded that
there was “no question” that the present scenario fit the reasonably
capable of repetition requirement.113 The court then remanded the case to
the SRO to issue findings as to the disputed issues.114
B. School Districts’ Future Pendency Obligation
Some courts, as discussed below, have held that a district’s future
pendency (i.e. financial) obligation may render a paid tuition
reimbursement claim justiciable. The rationale is that there remains a
controversy between the parties because without a judicial determination
on the merits, a school district might have to finance a student’s
education at a unilateral placement well beyond the school year (or
years) challenged in a due process complaint notice under pendency.115
Some courts have framed this inquiry in terms of the collateral legal
consequences exception.116 However, it is more appropriate to view a
district’s interest in avoiding indefinite pendency payments as an interest
that presents a live controversy. As noted above, the collateral legal
consequences exception was intended to ensure that an unlawful
110

Id. at *2 n.4. The court’s first reason is discussed more fully below in Section IV. B.
Id. at *2. The court’s reliance on Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, was
misplaced. In Schutz, the district disputed its obligation to pay for the student’s placement at a
private school during the pendency of proceedings (290 F.3d 476, 479 n.1 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Subsequent law has clarified that the district was indeed responsible for doing so (Letter to
Hampden, supra note 33; see also Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316(NGG)RER,
2008 WL 4890440, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
112
S.A., 2012 WL 6028938, at *2.
113
Id.
114
Id. at *3.
115
On this note, courts have debated whether this interest may constitute irreparable injury
sufficient to grant a preliminary injunction; compare D.C. v. Masucci, No. CV 13-1008 (PLF), 2014
WL 331344, at *5 (D.D.C. 2014) (irreparable injury), with D.C. v. Vineyard, 901 F. Supp. 2d 77,
88–89 (D.D.C. 2012) (not irreparable injury).
116
Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017–18 (D. Haw.
2012), aff’d sub nom. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., 506 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2013).
111
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conviction did not plague a criminal defendant. Dismissing such a case
as moot would sanction (allegedly) illegal governmental activity long
after the original criminal proceeding continued to have legal effects.
Courts carried this doctrine into the civil context with little reasoning and
its application in the IDEA context feels particularly strained.117
1. V.S. v. New York City Department of Education
In V.S. v. New York City Department of Education, a parent
challenged a May 2009 IEP in a July 2009 due process complaint notice
and requested tuition reimbursement for the 2009–10 school year.118 The
student attended a private school pursuant to an IHO decision dated
December 2008.119 In an April 2010 decision, an IHO sided with a parent
and ordered tuition reimbursement for the 2009–10 school year. An SRO
held that the case was moot because 2009–10 school year had expired
and the parent would receive tuition reimbursement for this school year
under pendency regardless of the SRO’s determination.120 On appeal,
both parties urged the court to overrule the SRO’s mootness
determination.121
First, the court agreed with the SRO that “funding for the 2009–2010
school year . . . [was] no longer at issue.”122 The court further agreed that
the parent’s sought relief would be unaffected by an administrative or
judicial determination as to this issue.123 However, the court next
determined that the case was not moot because “the [school district]
s[ought] redress from an alleged injury that, although collateral to the
central issue in the case, [wa]s ongoing and remediable.”124 The court
identified this injury as the district’s future financial obligation of
pendency. As the court explained that a determination of whether or not
the school district offered a FAPE for the 2009–10 school year would
“control [the student’s] pendency placement going forward.”125
117

In this regard, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that future financial
obligation could constitute a collateral legal consequence in a non-IDEA civil case, Pub. Utilities
Comm’n of State of Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451 (9th Cir. 1996). In the case, the petitioner and
an intervener argued that dismissal on mootness grounds would bring about the “forced discounting
of natural gas rates for state-regulated local distribution companies” as well as “lost revenues.” Id. at
1460. The Ninth Circuit held that these financial concerns were not legal effects and thus did not
justify imposition of the collateral legal effects doctrine. Id. at 1460–61.
118
No. 10–CV–05120 (JG)(JO), 2011 WL 3273922, at *3, *4 (E.D.N.Y 2011).
119
Id. at *3.
120
Id. at *8.
121
Id. at *9.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at *10.
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Therefore, based upon this injury, the court found that the dispute was
not moot. On the merits of the case, the court held that the school district
failed to offer the student a FAPE, the unilateral placement was
appropriate, and that no equitable factors diminished or precluded an
award of tuition reimbursement.126
2. Pawling Center School District v. New York State Education
Department
In Pawling Center School District v. New York State Education
Department, a school district appealed a decision that it failed to offer
the student a FAPE for the 1999–2000 school year.127 A prior SRO
decision established the student’s pendency placement at a private
school.128 The school district paid the student’s tuition during the 1997–
98 and 1998–99 school years.129 For the 1999–2000 school year, the
school district developed an IEP that recommended placement in a public
school.130 The parents filed a due process complaint notice alleging a
denial of FAPE and requesting tuition reimbursement for the 1999–2000
school year.131 An IHO found that the district offered a FAPE.132 An SRO
reversed, finding that the district failed to offer a FAPE and that the
unilateral placement was appropriate.133
On appeal, the school district admitted that it was financially
responsible for the 1999–2000 school year and that no determination by
the Appellate Division would affect the student’s placement during the
expired 1999–2000 school year.134 Nevertheless, the school district
argued that the appeal was not moot because the court’s determination
would affect the student’s future pendency placement.135 The Appellate
Division agreed with this argument, briefly stating that “a decision in
[the district’s] favor . . . could alter the child’s current educational
placement . . . [as well as] petitioner’s concomitant responsibility to pay
tuition during any challenges to future IEPs.”136 As for the substantive
issues in the case, the court agreed with the SRO and affirmed the private

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at *13–17.
3 A.D.3d 821, 824 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 824.
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school as the student’s pendency placement going forward.137
3. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Department of Education
While it recognized the effect of a judicial decision on a school
district’s future pendency obligation, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that this interest presented a live controversy in Marcus I ex
rel. Karen I. v. Department of Education.138 The student had attended a
private school since 2001.139 For the 2007–08 school year, the school
district recommended a residential placement for the student.140 The
parent objected and filed a due process complaint notice.141 The sole
issue in the due process complaint notice was whether the residential
program constituted, as required by the IDEA, the student’s least
restrictive environment (LRE).142 An IHO rejected the parents’ claims
and held that the recommended placement was the LRE.143
In a decision dated May 23, 2011, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the
issue of whether a residential placement represented the LRE for the
student during the 2007–08 school year was moot.144 The court noted that
the IEP developed for the subsequent 2008–09 school year reversed
course and recommended placement in a public school.145 This led the
court to conclude that the school district “apparently no longer believe[d]
that [the student] need[ed] a highly restrictive residential program.”146
Further, the court noted that the student “remained at [the private school]
pursuant to the IDEA’s stay-put provision” and did not enroll in the

137
Id. In a footnote, the court acknowledged that this could produce a curious result as, at
the time of the court’s decision, the student no longer attended the private school in question. Id. at
824 n.2.
138
434 F. App’x 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2011). Strictly speaking, Marcus I is a partially-paid
tuition reimbursement case. Before the district court, the parents complained that the district was
responsible for the costs of the student’s education at the private school and had not issued payment.
The court found that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain this claim as it was not raised in the
parents’ due process complaint notice. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Haw., Dep’t of Educ., No. 08–
00491 DAEBMK, 2009 WL 3378589, at *10 (D. Haw. Oct. 21, 2009). The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Marcus I., 434 F. App’x at 602. Nevertheless, Marcus I is a paid tuition reimbursement claim in
substance notwithstanding the district’s alleged failure to satisfy its pendency obligations.
139
Marcus I., 2009 WL 3378589, at *1 (district court decision).
140
Id. at *2.
141
Id. at *3.
142
Id. at *3. It is unclear whether the parent requested an award of tuition reimbursement.
See id. However, given the student’s pre-existing pendency entitlements, Marcus I. is nevertheless
relevant to the issue discussed in this section.
143
Id. at *3, *5–7.
144
Marcus I ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ. 434 F. App’x 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ninth
Circuit decision).
145
Id.
146
Id.
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residential program.147 Therefore, according to the court, it was “unclear
what effect any decision by this court would have on the parties.”148
The parent specifically argued that the appeal was not moot because
“it would affect whether the [school district] allow[ed] him to remain at
[the private school] pursuant to the stay-put provision.”149 The Ninth
Circuit rejected the argument that the pendency provision “guarantee[d]
a child the right to remain in any particular institution once proceedings
have concluded.”150 Even more to the point, the court stated that:
[T]he fact that dismissing an appeal as moot would remove a child
from the protection of the stay-put provision cannot in and of itself
create a live controversy, as the stay-put order will lapse however the
litigation concludes.151

C. Attorneys’ Fees
Because it can be the driving force in pursuing otherwise moot
claims, it is necessary to offer a final note on the applicability of
mootness to an attorneys’ fee determination. As noted above, parents
may recover their attorneys’ fees if they are deemed prevailing parties in
IDEA litigation. This includes fees expended at both the administrative
and judicial level. If a court declares a dispute moot because it was paid
for under pendency, attorneys’ fees related to the court proceeding—i.e.,
the proceeding where the dispute was deemed moot—will not be
recoverable.152 A judicial determination of mootness, however, does not
otherwise affect a party’s prevailing party status.153 Courts have reasoned
147

Id. at 602.
Id.
149
Id. The parent characterized this as a “collateral legal consequence.” Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
O’Shea v. Bd. of Educ. of Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 521 F. Supp. 2d 284, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); see M.S. ex rel. M.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); D.C. v. Jeppsen ex rel. M.J., 468 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113 (D.D.C. 2006); see also
Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 605 (2001). For a useful general discussion of prevailing party status under the IDEA, see A.R.
ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2005).
153
For example, in J.S. ex rel. Z.S. v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 501 F. App’x 95, 97–98 (2d
Cir. 2012), a May 2009 IHO decision found that the parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement
for the 2007–08 school year. Id. at 97. This school year had been paid through pendency. Id. The
SRO deemed the appeal moot. Id. The District Court awarded fees for the IHO proceedings but did
not award “any fees incurred in drafting” the documents submitted to the SRO, J.S. ex rel. Z.S. v.
Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 7:10 CV 8021(VB), 2011 WL 3251801, at *6–8 (S.D.N.Y. July 26,
2011). The District Court also awarded attorneys’ fees connected with the District Court action even
though neither party appealed the SRO’s decision because “[d]espite due demand, [the school
district] . . . refused to pay any attorneys’ fees or costs incurred by plaintiffs. . . .” J.S., 2011 WL
3251801, at *2. Without discussion of the effect of the SRO’s mootness determination (or whether
mootness may be applied in an administrative context), the Second Circuit declared the parents
prevailing parties and upheld the District Court’s determination. J.S., 501 F. App’x at 98–99.
148

2_Morton-Bentley Edited (Do Not Delete)

416

8/1/2015 11:23 PM

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2015

that a decision giving rise to prevailing party status must “alter the legal
relationship between the parties,” and the parties’ legal rights with regard
to a paid and expired school year could not possibly be altered by a
judicial decision. Additionally, it bears mentioning that, as seen in M.S.,
attorneys’ fees do not render an otherwise moot action justiciable.154
V. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Faced with the issue of whether a paid tuition reimbursement case is
moot, the above cases have reached varied conclusions. A review of
these decisions reveals that there is no satisfactory resolution to this
problem under current law. The argument for mootness correctly
recognizes that a dispute is moot if the complaining party received all of
the relief he or she requested. However, it turns a blind eye to the
advantageous circumstances that a mootness dismissal can bestow upon
parents intent upon educating their children in private schools. Both
exceptions to the mootness doctrine discussed above address this
inequity, but ignore the fact that satisfaction of a plaintiff’s requested
relief (i.e., tuition reimbursement) leaves nothing for a court to
adjudicate. Therefore, I propose an amendment to the IDEA that would
reconcile the conflict between pendency and mootness. Given the
jurisprudential (and, in federal court, Constitutional) roots of the
mootness doctrine, change must lie with pendency.
I contend that the pendency provision should be amended to address
paid tuition reimbursement claims and provide an incentive for students
to remain in the public school system. Specifically, school districts
should be afforded an opportunity to implement students’ pendency
placements within a public school.155 School districts interested in
pursuing this option would be required to submit a written letter to
parents that identifies the student’s then-current educational placement
and offers to implement it in a public school by the start of the upcoming
154

M.S., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 273, 281; see Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480
(1990) (“[an] interest in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or
controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim. . .”); M.M. v. Lafayette Sch.
Dist., 767 F.3d 842, 857 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended Oct. 1, 2014 (“[t]he existence of an attorneys’
fees claim . . . does not resuscitate an otherwise moot controversy.”), quoting Cammermeyer v.
Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 411 F.3d
225, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
155
This approach is consistent with the Second Circuit’s approach in T.M. ex rel. A.M. v.
Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 172 (2d Cir. 2014). In T.M., the district offered to
implement summer services that were currently provided by private providers. Id. at 171–72. The
parents declined, preferring the “stability and consistency” of the private services. Id. at 172. The
Second Circuit reversed this determination and stated that “the IDEA does not bar [a school district]
from subsequently correcting its mistake and offering to provide the required pendency services
directly.” Id. at 171.
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school year. If accepted by a parent, the school district would be required
to implement this program at the start of the school year or as soon as
reasonably possible. If a school district failed to implement this
pendency placement or chose to forego this procedure entirely, it would
remain responsible for the private tuition under current pendency
doctrine.
Should parents refuse a school district’s offer, they would remain
free to proceed to an impartial hearing. However, the school district
would not be responsible for private tuition costs as the proceeding
unfolded. To the extent this forces a parent to choose between accepting
a deficient IEP or accepting financial risk by enrolling the student in a
private school, this dilemma is already being faced by parents who
cannot take advantage of private school pendency. The current pendency
arrangement singles out a subset of parents for financial advantage and
condemns the rest to financial risk. If some parents must “unilaterally
change their child’s placement during the pendency of review
proceedings . . . at their own financial risk,” it is unclear why others are
absolved from this requirement based on a prior administrative victory.156
This amendment eliminates the mootness problem. If a parent
accepted a school district’s offer of public implementation, the parent
could not request tuition reimbursement for that school year because the
student was in a public school. If a parent rejected the offer, he or she
would not be entitled to funding from the school district during
administrative and judicial review by the terms of the amendment. And if
the school district did not utilize this procedure, its future pendency
obligation would not be a relevant factor in a mootness analysis because
it could utilize the written notice option to avoid these costs in the
following year.157 This amendment would additionally clarify the
meaning of “placement” in the pendency context.158
Proposed language for this amendment follows. For consistency, the
proposed amendment uses “school district” where the IDEA would use
“local educational agency.”

156
Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359,
373–74 (1985). Burlington held that parents do not waive their right to tuition reimbursement when
they unilateral place a child in a private school. The school district’s argument to the contrary was
based upon the language of the pendency provision. See id. at 370–72.
157
This approach does not eliminate all the ambiguities or problems associated with pendency. For example, an IHO would have to determine whether a school district’s offer of a similar but
not identical program would allow it to take advantage of this written notice provision.
158
T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009); James v. D.C., No. 12–
376(RJL), 2013 WL 2650091, at *3 (D.D.C. June 9, 2013).
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A. Current Educational Placement Where Student Attends a Private
School at Public Expense
(a) This section shall apply to students who, as the result of an
administrative or judicial determination that a school district failed to
make FAPE available and that a private school was appropriate,
currently attend a private school at public expense.
(b) If a parent files a due process complaint notice and the
circumstances described above in paragraph (a) are present, the
student’s then-current educational placement shall refer to his or her
educational program and not a physical location.
(c) If the parent rejects a written offer submitted by the school district
ten (10) days after the filing of a due process complaint notice whereby
the school district offers to implement the student’s then-current
educational placement in a public or state-approved nonpublic school,
the school district shall not be responsible for the student’s tuition costs
during administrative or judicial review pertaining to the
aforementioned due process complaint notice.
(i) The written offer described in paragraph (c) above shall identify
the student’s then-current educational placement which shall
include, but shall not be limited to, the classroom type (e.g.,
regular or special classroom), student to teacher ratio, frequency
and duration of related service sessions, supplementary aids and
services, and any services, devices, or plans pertaining to special
factors.
(ii) If the parent accepts the written offer described in paragraph
(c) above, the school district must implement the offered
placement at the start of the school year or as soon as reasonably
possible. If a school district fails to implement this placement, the
school district must pay the student’s tuition at a private school
during the pendency of administrative and/or judicial review when
and until the due process complaint is resolved.
(iii) If a school district fails to implement the program outlined in
its written offer within a reasonable period of time, a parent may
resort to the due process procedures outlined in part (f) of this
Section.
(iv) If information as to the student’s then-current educational
placement is not available to the school district and the parents do
not respond to reasonable requests for this information, an
impartial hearing officer may take this into account in determining
whether a school district shall be responsible for the student’s
tuition costs during administrative or judicial review.
(d) Nothing in this section shall affect a parent’s right to reimbursement
for private tuition expenses if an administrative or judicial official
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concludes that a school district failed to make FAPE available and that
the services unilaterally obtained by the parent were appropriate.

VI. CONCLUSION
No court has been able to satisfactorily resolve whether paid tuition
reimbursement claims are moot. This is due to the irreconcilable
relationship between tuition reimbursement, mootness, pendency,
judicial interpretations of these concepts. Therefore, this article proposes
an amendment to the IDEA’s pendency provision that would solve this
problem. Under this approach, a greater number of cases would be
deemed moot. This would not favor parents or school districts—it would
simply favor whoever was the victor at the administrative level. It would,
however, conserve judicial resources which, at present, are being used to
decide what otherwise appear to be moot cases. Mootness is a judicial
imperative that should be respected by amending the IDEA to prohibit
the consideration of moot paid tuition reimbursement claims.159

159

See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990).

